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The Bill for Rights
by Carl E. Schneider

W:

ere today is legislative ingenuity lavished more bountiully than on the titles of
statutes? And where has that ingenuity
been better exercised than in the name
"patients' bill of rights"? Do not our
dearest liberties flow from the Bill of
Rights? And who more deserves similar
protection than patients in the hands of
an angry Managed Care Organization?
And behold, both Democrats and Republicans, both President Clinton and
President Bush, have summoned us to
arms. The patients' bill of rights is an
idea whose time has seemed to have
come for several years, and only conflicts among the numerous proposals
and 11 September have postponed the
apparently inevitable.
The impetus for legislation is irresistible. Its name is managed care.
American medicine has moved from
cottage industry to bureaucratic behemoth with imposing and implacable
speed. Ought not combinations of great
size-malefactors of great wealth-be
regulated, especially when their services
can literally be vital? What is more, cost
containment with bite, once a fantasy, is
becoming a reality. When medical bureaucracies are commanded to conserve
resources, they in turn drive physicians
into an ethically tense position-serving both the god of patients' welfare and
the Mammon of MCO profits. Ought
not government police that conflict of
interest?
And where are the police when we
need them? Preempted. Our federal system confides governmental supervision
of medicine to the states. However,
most people obtain medical insurance

from their employers' benefits plans. In
1974, the federal government, concerned about the safety of employers'
pensions, enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to safeguard
them. To protect ERISA's strictures, that
statute "supersede[s] any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan." Although ERISA was primarily
aimed at pensions, it covers employee
benefits generally, including medical
benefits. Thus while states may continue to make individual doctors liable for
medical wrongs like malpractice, various other kinds of MCO activitiesand not least their cost-control programs-may escape the states' regulation, at least insofar as those programs
are part of an employee benefit plan. (I
say "may" because the extent to which
ERISA preempts state regulation of
M COs remains grossly uncertain even
after the Supreme Court's recent encounter with that question in Pegram v.
Herdrich. 1) And while the federal government has not been inactive, neither
has it acted systematically.
The case I have so far sketched for a
patients' bill of rights is circumstantial:
MCOs must want to economize, they
must pressure doctors to do so, doctors
must acquiesce, this must injure patients, and thus patients must be endowed with rights. Arguments for regulating managed care are not, however,
solely circumstantial; they are also anecdotal. What journalist trying to make
the dull vivid, what politician trying to
make duty plain, could resist the anecdotes lobbyists luridly spread before
them? In their canonical form, these

anecdotes tell of someone dying of a
dreadful disease, someone without hope
unless a bureaucracy will let doctors do
their jobs and will pay for a "cuttingedge" treatment. These anecdotes are
supplemented by stories that resonate
with us all about bureaucratic intrigue,
incompetence, and insolence.
So there is a circumstantial and anecdotal case for regulation. And that case
has become the case for a patients' bill
of rights. Versions of that device throng
like leaves in Vallombrosa and change
about as frequently, so generalization is
hazardous. Politically prominent versions, however, have attempted--often
in ambitious and elaborate ways-to establish procedures MCOs must use in
utilization reviews, to require appeals
outside the MCO of denials of treatment, to specify what services MCOs
must provide, to state what information
MCOs must and must not furnish, to
restrict MCOs from using incentive systems to influence doctors' decisions, to
extend patients' ability to sue their
MCOs, and on and on.
Well, who could object to any of
this? In a later column I will examine
specific provisions that are actually enacted or seem about to be. Here I will
suggest seven questions we should ask
before succumbing to the conventional
wisdom about "the need for a strong patients' bill of rights," as conventional
wisdom's fount, the New York Times editorial page, put it. 2
First, how convincing is the evidence
that legislation is necessary? Circumstantial evidence and anecdotes are pitiful bases for public policy, but they may
be irresistible when they confirm what
seems obvious. Nevertheless, it is wise
to doubt the obvious, and there are especially provoking reasons to do so
here. For example, it is widely assumed
that MCOs' efforts to economize must
mean that they offer worse care than
their alternatives. Yet "[o]verall, the evidence ... does not support the premise
that managed care has lowered the effectiveness of care."3 It is also widely assumed, and doctors widely insist, that
MCOs rob physicians of time with patients. Yet during the period in which
MCOs have proliferated, the time doc-

10 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 21 Jun 2017 18:30:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

january-February 2002

tors spend with patients has actually increased.4
Second, what are the goals of a patients' bill of rights? To make health care
more efficient? More accountable? Fairer? Cheaper? Better? These are only a
few of the possible goals. And they are
all worthy goals, but a statute that serves
one often disserves others. If we simply
ask whether a bill of rights promotes
one desirable end, we may overlook the
ways it interferes with others.
Third, will a patients' bill of rights
accomplish its goals? Law often frustrates its makers, and the history of
bioethicallegal reform has been the history of humiliation. Why expect a bill
of rights to do better? For example, bills
of rights unimaginatively attempt to
bring "due process" to the MCO. In
other areas, due process solutions repeatedly go unutilized by the people
they intend to benefit. A recent survey
of research on the effects of MCOs
finds that "sick enrollees who are poor
or elderly fare worse in HMOs."5 But
such patients are exactly the people least
likely to be aggressive enough to wring
results from due process rights. Put it
this way: is the only cure for the ills of
bureaucracy more bureaucracy?
Fourth, cui bono--who benefits? Patients' bills of rights are piously described as serving patients. But doctors'
groups have been instrumental in framing and promoting many of them. "The
voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are
the hands of Esau." Have doctors'
groups again succumbed to the temptation of advocating legislation that benefits the profession more than the patient? Bioethicists have written for years
about the "abject" relationship of patient to doctor. MCOs are the only
countervailing force on the horizon. In
short, if medical costs are to be cabined
and medical care to be improved, doctors' power will need to be constrained,
not institutionalized under the banner
of patients' rights.
Fifth, in a medical world in turbulent change, are these the rules we want
to enact into legislation that will be
hard to alter? Managed care has gone
from marginal to predominant in hardly more than a decade, and it continues
january-February 2002

to develop tumultuously. A bill of rights
attempts to enshrine timeless principles.
Are these they? For instance, even as
Congress debates mandating cumbersome procedures for utilization reviews,
at least one prominent MCO has "decided to abandon utilization review
mechanisms due to their cost and the
relatively small number of recommended treatments that were found to be inappropriate. "6
Sixth, is the legislation so harmless
that nothing can be lost by enacting it?
If bills of rights simply ask MCOs to do
what is plainly right, why not pass one?
Here, we must remember what brought
us to MCOs-namely, the struggle to
subdue health care costs. Governmental
efforts were feeble and failed. Employers
acted by promoting MCOs. They seem
to have won a battle, but the war remains perilously in doubt. Patients' bills
of rights are largely directed against the
aspects of managed care that have
helped tame costs. Few argue that we
should devote more of our GOP to
health care. Employers yearn to control
health care costs. Employees, when
given a choice about whether to buy
more extensive health insurance or to
spend their money elsewhere, repeatedly choose the latter, so that patients' bills
of rights seem likely to impose on people insurance more expensive than they
would choose to buy for themselves.
Small wonder, then, that support for
bills of rights plummets when their
costs are described. And small wonder
that while Congress congratulates itself
for imposing a bill of rights on private
MCOs, it hesitates to inflict one on federal programs.
Seventh, is a patients' bill of rights
where we should spend scarce reformist
energies? Congress has repeatedly failed
to formulate cogent health policy, and it
has tried only sporadically. Such moments ought not be wasted. Let me
make the point a challenge: Should a
country in which more than 40 million
people lack health insurance expend
limited human and legislative resources
to make medical care more expensivebut not necessarily better-for those
who already have it?

These seven questions about patients' bills of rights have been skeptical.
But they are the same questions we
should ask about any health care legislation. And one reasonable inference
from them is that many kinds of proposals ought to be considered. Law's arsenal enjoys various weapons. One, for
example, is the law of contract. It might
seek to build on the market's energy and
creativity in devising managed care but
to structure the market to better reflect
what patients want. Another weapon is
the law of tort. Perhaps much can be
gained by shifting malpractice liability
from individual doctors to MCOs and
hospitals. Yet another weapon is to assign government agencies regulatory authority, an approach that seems most
successful when the agency seeks less to
write and enforce its own rules than to
stimulate an industry to intelligent and
aggressive self-regulation. But, surely,
before seizing any weapon, systematic
inquiry into its costs and its benefits is
essential.
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